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Abstract
The paper addresses mainly three questions. One, do workers tend to be
employed by employers of the same ethnic group; two, what is the structure
of the equilibrium wage contract, and three, do more ethnically homogeneous
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all employers oﬀer the same wage contract and workers are hired by employers
of the closest ethnic aﬃliation. In terms of the equilibrium wage contract,
its nature depends on the attitude towards risk of both sides of the market.
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more homogenous the labor market, the more deterministic is the wage.
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“Those who study modern Africa commonly highlight three features: its
poverty, its instability, and its ethnic diversity. ... scholars reason that Africa
is poor because it is unstable and that its instability derives from its ethnic
complexity. Ethnicity thus lies, it is held, at the root of Africa’s development
crisis.”
Robert H. Bates (2000)
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the economic conse-
quences of ethnic diversity, especially in terms of economic development and
growth (Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005). These studies performed at the country level suggest
that ethnically diverse societies have slower economic growth and are more
prone to corruption and political instability than ethnically homogenous soci-
eties as a result of political conflict across ethnic groups. As Barr and Oduro
(2002) put it, “surely the time has come to place the economics of ethnicity
on the agenda for policy debate”.
However, to the best of our knowledge, few researches have investigated
the economic consequences of ethnicity at a more microeconomic level. Miguel
and Gugerty (2005) examine the impact of ethnic diversity on local public
provision (i.e. local funding of primary schools and community water wells)
in sub-Saharian Africa (western Keyna). They show that ethnic diversity is
negatively related to local public goods provision in this rural African setting
because social sanctions are imposed more eﬀectively within ethnic groups than
between groups. In another paper (Barr and Oduro, 2002), the consequences
of ethnic fractionalization (i.e. the segmentation of a population into several
groups that are distinct in terms of language and/or culture) on Ghana’s labor
market is analyzed. Their main finding is to show that workers who are related
to their employers earn a wage premium.
The aim of the present paper is to follow this line of research by analyzing
the impact of ethnic diversity on labor contracts in developing countries.
The standard literature on agricultural tenancy explains the existence of
diﬀerent contracts, such as sharecropping, fixed-rental and fixed-wage con-
tracts, in rural areas, without taking into account the role of ethnic diversity.
In general, to account for these diﬀerent contracts, three major explanations
have been oﬀered: (i) trade oﬀ between risk sharing and transaction costs
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(uncertainty, risk and moral hazard problems), (ii) screening workers of diﬀer-
ent abilities (adverse selection problems), (iii) market imperfections for inputs
besides land (see in particular Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1982, McIntosh,
1984, Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). All of these approaches have been well
developed both theoretically and empirically (see in particular Stiglitz, 1974,
Cheung, 1969, McIntosh, 1984, Newberry and Stiglitz, 1979, Shaban, 1987),
even though the third approach has received less attention in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, the link between ethnic diversity and wage
contracts has been neglected and the aim of this paper is to provide a simple
model that sheds some light on these aspects. It is indeed well documented
that, in most countries, individuals tend to work with employers of the same
ethnic origin. In developed countries, foreigners and recent migrants, like for
example the Cubans in Florida or the Chinese and Mexican in California,
form closed-knit societies and work together in cities (see e.g. Borjas, 1999).
The same is true in the U.K. for Indians, Bangladeshi or Pakistanis (see e.g.
Modood et al., 1997). In developing countries, the ethnic origin is even more
crucial to understand the way labor markets work both in urban and rural
areas (see e.g. Assaad, 1997, and Wahba and Zenou, 2005, for Egypt, Sadoulet
et al., 1997, for Philippines, van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001, for Viet
Nam, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001, for India and Pakistan, Barr and Oduro,
2002, and Udry and Conley, 2004, for Ghana, Krishnan and Sciubba, 2004, for
Ethiopia).
To be more precise, we consider a population of workers (that could be for
example laborers) and employers (that could be for example landlords) who
belong to diﬀerent ethnic groups, so that working together implies a cost (be-
cause of language, religion and/or cultural diﬀerences). Part of the production
is random (because for example of climate change) and not observable (ex
ante) by both employers and employees. Our analysis encompasses both rural
and urban labor markets.
We evacuate moral hazard as well as adverse selection problems by focusing
on closely-knit communities. Indeed, the ignorance on the part of landlords
about tenants’ abilities is quite inappropriate for most rural communities (this
is already discussed in Bardhan, 1984 and Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). This
is also true for urban labor markets (see e.g. Assaad, 1997, and Wahba and
Zenou, 2005). Most papers show that elements of altruism among kin reduce
the conflict of interest between two partners and create relations of trust and
confidence in which cheating is less likely to occur. For example, Pandey (2002)
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documents the fact that working with in-kins prevents workers to shirk (moral
hazard) because of reputation eﬀects and peer group (or family) pressures.1
Contrary to the ‘standard’ approach with moral hazard where the focus
is on the tension between the interests of the workers (laborers) and the firm
(landlord) in an environment where (like here) output is not perfectly observ-
able, in our model, the ‘tension’ is between employers of diﬀerent ethnic origins.
Indeed, because workers and employers belong to diﬀerent ethnic groups, there
is a cost for workers to work for an employer with a diﬀerent ethnic back-
ground. This implies that employers have market power over workers with
similar ethnic origin, so that they play a Nash game with the other employers
to determine the optimal wage contract. In particular, given the competition
in the labor market and the volatility of output, profit-maximizing employers
set a wage in order to attract enough workers and to reduce the risk associated
with the output’s uncertainty. It is not surprising that most of our results will
depend on the degree of competition in the labor market (as measured by the
number of landlords, the ethnic cost ...) and on the degree of risk aversion of
both workers and firms. In particular, if employers are very risk averse, they
will be very sensitive to large variations in output and will transfer as much
as risk as they can onto laborers. So our main question is how to share the
risk of a random production that aﬀects both employers’ profits and workers’
utility in a framework where all agents are ethnically diﬀerentiated and where
employers imperfectly compete with each other to attract workers.
Our results are the following. First, we obtain that, in equilibrium, employ-
ers tend to hire workers of similar ethnic background and employers’ co-ethnics
earn more than other workers. Second, in terms of the equilibrium wage con-
tract, its nature depends on the attitude towards risk of both sides of the
market. If both employers and workers are risk averse, each side would like
to shift as much risk as possible to the other side. The fact that workers
bear disutility from working with ethnically diﬀerent employers gives the lat-
ter market power in proportion to the average workers disutility. The fewer
employers there are, the greater the cost of a worker from switching to a more
distant employer, hence the more risk employers is able to shift to workers.
If workers are risk neutral and employers are risk averse, workers bear all the
risk in every case, and the reverse if employers are risk neutral. Finally, the
1Sadoulet et al. (1997) also observe that kinship networks are a natural cause of co-
operation and thus remove the moral hazard problem faced by landlords. To quote them:
“Kinship networks are important to reduce moral hazards and provide a commitment device
when intertemporal resource transfers are involved.”
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more ethnically homogeneous is a labor market, the less the wage depends on
random shocks.
2 The model
We develop a theoretical model in which the interaction in the labor market
(i.e. wage setting) between employers and workers of diﬀerent ethnic origins
is explicitly taken into account.
In the literature, the measurement of ethnic diversity has been a very dif-
ficult task. There are six distinct characteristics of an individual that matter
for ethnolinguistic classification: two of them (race and color) are inherited
whereas two (culture and language) are learned. The fifth characteristic (the
ethnic origin) is more diﬃcult to define and refers to the main name by which
people are known. Finally, the sixth component (nationality), in contrast
to the other characteristics, can be changed. To summarize these diﬀerent
aspects, two types of synthetic indices have been proposed: indices of fraction-
alization and indices of polarization. First, the most famous and widely used
is the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), constructed by Taylor
and Hudson (1972), which is defined as:
ELF = 1−
NX
i=1
ψ2i (1)
where if we consider religious (or ethnic) diversity, ψi is the proportion of
people who professes religion i (or belongs to ethnic group i). Basically, this
indicator can be interpreted as measuring the probability that two randomly
selected individuals in a country will belong to diﬀerent ethnolinguistic groups.
As a result, the index ELF increases when the number of groups increases.
Second, the polarization index has been proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994)
and can be written as follows.
PO = k
NX
i=1
X
j 6=i
ψ1+γi ψj |xi − xj| (2)
where the ψs are the sizes of each group in proportion to the total population,
the term |xi − xj| measures the ‘distance’ between two ethnic (or religious)
groups, i and j, and γ and k are parameters.
These two indices: ethnic (or religious) fractionalization and polarization
take values between 0 and 1. The higher the indices, the more the society is
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ethnically diverse. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) provide a table where
they give the ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization indices for
most countries in the world. For example, a country like Algeria has very low
indices of religious fractionalization and polarization (not surprisingly since
most individuals are Muslims) but relatively high indices of ethnic polariza-
tion (0.514) and fractionalization (0.299). On the contrary, a country like
Bangladesh, has relatively high indices on religion (0.503 and 0.261 respec-
tively) but relatively low indices on ethnicity (0.132 and 0.068 respectively).
In the present paper, in order to model ethnicity, we use an approach in
terms of ‘distance’ between group. We assume that there is an ethnic ‘distance’
between workers and employers of diﬀerent ethnic groups and, as a result, a
cost t per unit of (ethnic) ‘distance’ is borne when they interact with each
other. The most natural interpretation of t is ‘language, religion and culture’.
There is indeed a cost to work with individuals of diﬀerent cultures, religions
and diﬀerent languages since, as stated by Lazear (1999), ‘common culture
and common language facilitate trade between individuals’. There are very
strong evidences on this issue (see among others Chiswick, 1978, Chiswick
and Miller, 1996, Dustman and Preston, 2001, for the U.S. and the U.K, and
Assaad, 1997, or Barr and Ondoro, 2002, for less developed countries) showing
that it is indeed costly to work with individuals of diﬀerent ethnic groups
because of language and cultural diﬀerences.2
It has to be clear that the way we model ethnicity is extremely simple and
do not have all the rich aspects of the measures proposed above (fractional-
ization or polarization indices). However, we are capturing one dimension of
these measures, namely the ‘distance’, which could be in terms of religion,
culture, race, etc., between two diﬀerent groups in a given country.
We choose to represent the ethnicity space by the circumference C of a
circle of length L (Salop, 1979). On this circle, n employers and a continuum
of workers are uniformly distributed along its circumference. This captures
the fact that ethnic diversity is pre-determined and that the ethnic distance
between a worker and an employer of the same ethnic group is obviously lower
than with an employer of a diﬀerent ethnic group. For simplicity, we assume
that employers are equally spaced along the circumference C so that L/n is the
ethnic distance between two adjacent employers. Workers reside in diﬀerent
‘locations’ along the circumference, which implies that they support diﬀerent
ethnic costs to work with diﬀerent firms. In other words, we segment the
2Co-ethnicity is defined with repect to shared ethnic identity.
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population into several groups that are distinct in terms of language, religion
and/or culture. Formally, the ethnic cost is given by a linear function t |x− yi|
of the diﬀerence between a worker of ethnicity x ∈ C and an employer of
ethnicity yi ∈ C. To sum-up, in our framework, ethnic diversity is captured
by L, the size of the ethnic space, n, the number of ethnic employers and t,
the cost of interacting with other communities. Indeed, the higher (lower) L
and/or the lower (higher) n, the more ethnically diversified (homogenous) is
the labor market. Also, the higher t, the more costly it is to interact with
members of other ethnic groups and the more frictional is the labor market.
All workers are identically productive and produce q observable units of
output. This means that agents are horizontally diﬀerentiated, which implies
that employers do not come predominantly from one ethnic group (which is the
case in most developing countries; see our discussion above and, in particular,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
It should be clear that, because of both employers’ and workers’ ethnic
diversities, the competition in the labor market is imperfect since employers
have local monopsony power over workers of similar ethnic background. This
is because it is more costly for a worker of a certain ethnic group to work with
an employer of a diﬀerent ethnic background than with a similar one.
Firms produce an homogeneous good (which is taken to be the numeraire)
sold on a competitive market whose production is random. Indeed, for exam-
ple, even if all the inputs that a farmer can reasonably control are properly
applied, the size of the harvest is still heavily dependent on Nature and will
vary. To express this uncertainty, we suppose that the production level is q+eθ,
where q is the observable part of the production and where eθ is described by
a random variable whose mean is chosen to be 0 (without loss of generality)
while its variance is σ2. As in Sandmo (1971), greater output uncertainty is
measured by an increase in σ2: a mean preserving spread in production. In
the context of developing countries, the random part of the production is due
for example to climate changes. In other words, all workers are assumed to
produce q but there is a common shock (uncertainty) captured by eθ that is out
of control of both the employer and the worker and that aﬀects production.
We would now like to define the optimal contract on which both the em-
ployer and the worker agree. As discussed in the introduction, moral hazard
problems are assumed to be relatively small, so that we have chosen to ignore
them. This is admittedly a simplifying assumption but help us to focus on
labor heterogeneity and ethnic issues. Therefore, in this paper, we would like
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to focus on optimal risk sharing and on employers’ choice of method of pay in
a framework where both employers and workers are ethnically diﬀerentiated.
For that, each employer i = 1, ...n proposes the following revenue (contract)
to the worker:
eRi = αi(eθ + q) + βi i = 1, ..., n (3)
with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 and βi ≷ 0. It is easy to see from (3) that this contract
consists of two elements: a fixed part βi that can be positive, negative or equal
to zero, and a variable part, which is tied to the (random) output. In fact,
the worker obtains a percentage αi of his/her production and the landlord
gets a percentage 1− αi of the worker’s production. The following definition
characterizes the diﬀerent possible contracts.
Definition 1 For workers employed by firm i, we have:
• A fixed-wage (or rent) contract is when the workers’ compensation
is independent of what they produce, i.e. αi = 0.
• A pure piece-rate contract is when workers are only paid according
to what they produce, i.e. βi = 0.
• A full-residual claimant contract is when workers obtain the full
benefit of their work but pay a fixed amount to the employer, i.e. αi = 1
and βi < 0.
• A share-tenancy contract (sharecropping) is a mix of fixed and
piece-rate contracts, i.e. 0 < αi < 1 and βi > 0 or βi < 0. There are
indeed two parts in the compensation: a fixed one, which is independent
of production, and a variable one, which is a percentage of production.
The most natural application of these contracts in developing countries is
in rural labor markets.3 In that case, a share-tenancy contract (sharecropping)
typically entitles the supplier of land services to receive from the supplier of
labor a prearranged proportion of crop output. Sharecropping thus diﬀers
significantly from contracts in which the rent for land or the wages for labor
are fixed and do not vary with output (fixed-wage or fixed-rent contract); nor
it should be confused with various forms of piecework (piece-rate contract),
3As mentioned above, our analysis can be applied to both urban and rural labor markets.
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where labor is engaged for a specific purpose, usually harvesting, an rewarded
proportionally from the total crop. Finally, as pointed out by Lazear (1995), a
typical example of a full-residual claimant contract is the case of taxi drivers.
Indeed, the latter rent a car to a taxicab company i (βi < 0) and then keep
everything that they make for themselves (αi = 1). In agriculture, the laborer
can pay a fixed cost to the landlord to exploit the plot of hired land and then
keep all the proceeds from the crops.
One of the main originality of our framework is to consider not one (as it
is usually the case) but a finite number of heterogenous employers (in terms
of ethnicity) and a continuum of heterogenous workers (in terms of ethnicity).
Because of this double heterogeneity, the competition in the labor market
will be imperfect since employers have some monopsony power over workers
that are ethnically ‘close’. The other original part of this work is that the
outside option of workers is endogenous and depends on the strategies of other
employers. Indeed, each employer has to decide the optimal contract by taken
into account the strategies of the other firms in the market. Even if some
workers are ethnically diﬀerent from an employer, they may work with him/her
if this employer proposes a more advantageous contract.
Formally, firms choose simultaneously αi and βi (Nash equilibrium) and
therefore workers’s revenues, eR1, .., eRi, .., eRn, before the realization of the riskeθ but anticipating the impact of their compensation on workers’ labor supply.
Thus, given (3), the realized wage of a worker of ethnicity x working for an
employer of ethnicity yi is given by:
eZx,yi = eRi − t |x− yi| = αi(eθ + q) + βi − t |x− xi| (4)
In this section, we assume that workers are risk averse. In order to obtain
closed forms solutions, we further assume that a worker of ethnicity x working
for an employer of ethnicity yi has a mean-variance utility function given by:4
Ux,yi = E( eZx,yi)− a2V ar( eZx,yi)
= E
h
αi(eθ + q) + βi − t |x− yi|i− a
2
V ar
h
αi(eθ + q) + βi − t |x− yi|i
= Wi − t |x− xi| (5)
where Wi = αi q+βi− a2α2iσ2 is the expected utility gross of ethnic costs when
4It is easy to see that the case of risk neutrality is a special case of our mean-variance
utility function when a = 0. We will study this issue in the next section.
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working for firm i, E[·] is the expectation operator, V ar[·] is the variance
operator and a ≥ 0 is the degree of absolute risk aversion.5
Observe thatWi is not a random variable since employers commit to wages
and employment before output realizations. Once each firm i proposesWi, each
worker chooses to be hired by the employer that gives the highest utility (net of
ethnic costs). Since firms anticipate the choice of workers, they hire all work-
ers who want to work at the prevailing expected utilities, (W1, ..,Wi, ..,Wn),
because they know that these workers are ethnically quite similar. The reserva-
tion wage is assumed to be the same across workers since they are all identical
in terms of productivity. Thus, without loss of generality, the reservation wage
is set equal to zero.
Given Wi−1 and Wi+1, firm i’s labor pool is composed of two sub-segments
whose outside boundaries are given by marginal workers x and x for whom the
net wage is identical between firms i − 1 and i, on the one hand, and firms i
and i+ 1, on the other. In other words, x is the solution of the equation:
Wi − t(yi − x) =Wi−1 − t(x− yi−1)
so that
x =
Wi−1 −Wi + t(yi + yi−1)
2t
(6)
In this case, firm i attracts workers whose locations belong to the interval
[x, xi] because the expected utility net of ethnic costs they obtain from firm
i is higher than the one they would obtain from firm i − 1. Clearly, workers
belonging to the interval [xi−1, x] are hired by firm i− 1. In a similar way, we
have:
x =
Wi −Wi+1 + t(yi + yi+1)
2t
(7)
Consequently, firm i’s labor pool is defined by the interval [x, x]. In this
context, firm i’s realized profits can thus be written as:
eΠi = Z x
x
(eθ + q −Ri)dx
= (eθ + q −Ri)(x− x) = h(1− αi)(eθ + q)− βii (x− x)
5To derive (5), one must use our initial hypotheses: E[eθ] = 0 and V ar[eθ] = σ2.
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In this section, we assume that landlords are risk averse. Here also, in
order to obtain closed forms solutions, we further assume that firms have a
mean-variance utility function given by:6
Vi = E(eΠi)− ρ
2
V ar(eΠi) (8)
where ρ ≥ 0 is the degree of absolute risk aversion and where eΠi is defined by
(8). Hence, we can rewrite (8) as follows:
Vi = [(1− αi)q − βi] (x− x)−
ρ
2
(1− αi)2(x− x)2σ2 (9)
Since employers and workers are all assumed to be risk averse, the problem
here is how to share the risk in the context of imperfect competition and ethnic
diversity. Firms play a Nash game to determine αi and βi. We will see that
distinct types of compensations will emerge depending on the values of the
diﬀerent parameters.
3 Labor market equilibrium
We can now derive our first result. We assume that all workers take a job in
equilibrium. In this context, the outer boundaries of firm i’s labor pool are
given by (6) and (7). Firm i chooses αi and βi that maximize its utility (9).
We have the following result.7
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness) If
q > 3
σ2ρLa
ρL+ an
+
4tL
n
(10)
holds, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium given by:
α∗ =
ρL
ρL+ an
(11)
β∗ = (1− α∗)q − ρL
n
(1− α∗)2q2σ2 − tL
n
=
an
ρL+ an
µ
q − σ
2ρLa
ρL+ an
¶
− tL
n
6Again, it is easy to see that the case of risk neutrality is a special case of our mean-
variance utility function when ρ = 0. We will study this issue in the next section.
7Since at the symmetric Nash equilibrium all firms pay the same wage, we have skipped
the index i.
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and, before ethnic costs, all workers obtain the same following positive util-
ity:
W ∗ = q − σ
2ρLa (ρL/2 + an)
(ρL+ an)2
− tL
n
(12)
whereas the equilibrium employers’ profit is equal to:
V ∗ =
µ
L
n
¶2 ∙
t+
ρ
2
µ
an
ρL+ an
¶
σ2
¸
(13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
First, we obtain that, in equilibrium, employers tend to hire workers of
similar ethnic background (in equilibrium, the maximum ‘distance’ to hire
someone is L/2n) and employers’ co-ethnics earn more than other workers
(indeed, even though the remuneration (12) is the same for all workers, because
of ethnic costs, the net remuneration decreases with the ethnic ‘distance’ to
the employer).
Second, this general case corresponds to an ‘impure’ piece rate (share-
cropping) contract in which workers have a fixed pay equals to β ≷ 0 and a
variable one which is a fraction 0 < α < 1 of what they produce (see Definition
1 above). In our model, the only choice faced by workers consists in decid-
ing whom employer they want to work for (this depends on both their ethnic
distance to that employer and the compensation oﬀered). Given this choice,
each employer i chooses αi and βi that maximize his/her profit by taking as
given the choice of the αs and βs of the other employers in the economy. Each
employer also takes into account the impact of his/her compensation policy on
his/her ‘natural’ workers (i.e. those whose is enough close to the employer’s
ethnic group). In this respect, we have:8
∂W
∂α
= q − aασ2 > 0
and
∂W
∂β
= 1 > 0
Indeed, when firms increase the variable part α or the fixed part β of the
salary, their labor supply increases. It is interesting to observe from ∂W/∂α
that the reaction of workers negatively depends on both σ2, the variance of
the production, and a the workers’ degree of risk aversion.9 In particular, if
8Observe that ∂W
∗
∂α > 0 by using (20) in the Appendix.
9Indeed, it is easy to check that:
∂2W ∗
∂α∂σ2
< 0 and
∂2W ∗
∂α∂a
< 0
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workers are very risk averse, their utility will not increase very much following
a rise in α.
Third, one can verify from (11) that an increase in ρ, the degree of risk
aversion of employers, and/or a decrease in a, the degree of risk aversion of
workers, raises α∗. Concerning a, this is quite natural since more risk-averse
workers prefer to see a reduction in α, the uncertain part of their salary.
Concerning ρ, the decision to increase α∗ depends on the competition in the
labor market. If it is very fierce, because for example employers are not very
risk averse (low ρ), then employers reduce α∗ to attract more workers. The
eﬀects of ρ and a on β, the fixed part of the pay, are more complex, and will
be analyzed in more details in the next section.
We can also analyze the eﬀect of ethnic diversification on α and β. We
have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Ethnic diversity)
(i) The more ethnically homogenous a labor market (i.e. higher L or lower
n), the lower the level of piece rate α∗ but the higher the fixed part of
the remuneration β∗. In other words, the more ethnically homogeneous
a labor market, the less the wage depends on random shocks.
(ii) The ethnic cost t has not impact on α∗ but has a negative eﬀect on β∗.
In other words, the more “frictions” or “conflicts” that exist between
diﬀerent ethnic groups, the lower the deterministic part of the wage.
Thus, in ethnically homogenous countries, where employers and employees
are relatively homogenous (if L/n is quite small, then no worker will be eth-
nically very ‘far away’ from an employer), most of the wage is independent of
the random shock. In other words, the more homogenous the society, the more
firms take all the risk associated with random shocks and the more the wage is
deterministic. As mentioned above, L captures the degree of ethnic diversity
in the economy. Indeed, when L increases, the ethnic space is bigger and thus
workers of a certain ethnic group are even more attached to employers of sim-
ilar ethnic group and more distant to employers of other groups. This implies
that local employers have a higher monopsony power over workers of similar
ethnic background. The variable n captures the number of employers in the
economy. So, when n increases, workers are more likely to find employers of
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similar ethnic background, which implies that employers have less monopsony
power.
Another interesting result is about t. The latter measures in some sense
the cost of interacting with people of diﬀerent ethnic groups. This means
that we can view t as a measure of the “tension” or the “conflict” that exists
between diﬀerent ethnic groups. Result (ii) indicates that, for a given level
of ethnic diversity, the more intense the conflicts in a labor market, the lower
the deterministic part of the wage. Indeed, when t increases (for example the
cost of learning a language is high or cultural diﬀerences are large), employers
have higher monopsony power on workers of similar ethnic background since
it becomes too costly for these workers to work for other employers with more
diverse ethnic origin. So, when t rises, employers can decrease the fixed part
of the wage. They cannot however aﬀect the piece rate since the latter is tied
to output only.
Observe finally that the equilibrium wage (12), or more precisely the equi-
librium utility before ethnic costs, is always below q the marginal productivity
of workers. Indeed, because firms have market power, they tend to exploit
workers by setting wages below their marginal productivity. The following
result confirms this intuition.
Proposition 3 (Perfect competition) When the number of firms becomes
arbitrarily large, then
lim
n→∞
α∗(n) = 0 and lim
n→∞
β∗(n) = q
and the equilibrium wage tends to its competitive level (W ∗ = q) while
profits tend to zero.
This result shows that the competitive model of the labor market is indeed
the limit of the spatial model. Once again a key element of our analysis is the
interaction between firms to attract workers. So when n → +∞, firms have
no more market power since each worker works for an employer belonging
exactly to the same ethnic group (ethnic costs are equal to zero). As a result,
competition pushes the wages to workers’ marginal product.
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4 Firms’ choice of method of pay10
We have obtained a general result. We would now like to see under which con-
dition firms set diﬀerent types of compensations. We start with the following
result.
Proposition 4 (Salop (1979)) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
which W ∗ = q − tL/n and V ∗ = tL2/n2 if
(i) either employers are risk-neutral (ρ = 0) and workers are risk-averse
(a > 0). In this case, employers set a fixed wage such that α∗ = 0 and
β∗ = q − tL/n.
(ii) or workers are risk-neutral (a = 0) and employers are risk-averse (ρ >
0). In this case, employers set a piece rate such that α∗ = 1 and β∗ =
−tL/n.
The results of Proposition 4 are obviously a particular case of Proposition
1 when either firms or workers are risk neutral. This is the standard model
of Salop (1979). Interestingly, the results strongly depend on the competition
in the labor market and, therefore, on the degree of ethnic diversity of both
employers and workers. Indeed, as stated above, ethnic diversity is measured
here by t, L and n. So when the worker’ ethnic cost t or the degree of ethnic
diﬀerentiation L increases or when the number of employers n decreases, then,
workers’ utility decreases whereas employers’ utility increases. Moreover, the
wage contract set by employers also hinges on ethnic diversity. Indeed, even
though the two cases (i) and (ii) leads to the same utility levelW ∗ for workers
and the same profit level V ∗ for employers, the wage contract is quite diﬀerent.
In case (i) where employers are risk-neutral and workers are not, it is optimal
for employers to set a fixed wage that do not depend on the production q of
workers so that α∗ = 0 and β∗ > 0. However, the fixed part β∗ decreases
with ethnic diversity so that when workers and employers are more ethnically
diﬀerentiated (t and L high and n low), β∗ decreases because workers are more
isolated from employers of diﬀerent ethnic background and closer to employers
of similar ethnic origin. On the contrary, when employers are risk averse and
workers risk neutral (case (ii)), employers set a piece-rate contract in which
10Since all propositions in this section are a special case of Proposition 1, the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium is always guaranteed by condition (10), which is written using
the parameters of each special case.
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α∗ = 1 and β∗ < 0. In other words, workers are exactly paid according to what
they produce (q + eθ) minus a fixed part β. In this case, employers care about
random production (since it aﬀects their profit) but workers do not. Therefore,
they can set a pure piece-rate system and still attract workers. Here also, β∗
negatively varies with ethnic diversity.
Corollary 1 (No ethnic cost) When workers are risk-neutral (a = 0), em-
ployers are risk-averse (ρ > 0) and the ethnic cost t is equal to zero, then
employers set a pure piece rate such that α∗ = 1 and β∗ = 0. The equilibrium
utility and profit levels are respectively given by W ∗ = q and V ∗ = 0.
This corollary reinforces our previous result on piece-rate contracts. It
says that, if workers do not bear any ethnic cost to work with employer of
diﬀerent ethnic groups, then it is optimal for employers to set a pure piece-
rate contract in which workers are paid according to what they produce. In
this case, all risk-neutral workers obtain the same maximum level of utility q
whereas all risk-averse employers get the lowest profit level 0. This is because t
is a measure of employers’ market power and thus of the degree of competition
in the labor market since higher t implies more market power and thus less
intense competition. So when the ethnic cost t is equal to zero, the competition
between employers to attract workers becomes fiercer and risk-averse employers
do not obtain anymore the fixed compensation of their workers.
Observe that this case does not imply that labor is not diﬀerentiated since
L > 0. In order to have no heterogeneity at all in this model, one must assume
that L = 0. Then, without any other hypothesis, it is easy to verify that
α∗ = 0 and β∗ = q so that W ∗ = q and V ∗ < 0.
Let us now assume that employers and workers are both risk averse but
have exactly the same degree of risk aversion, i.e., ρ = a > 0. In this case,
employers will optimally set an impure piece-rate contract to workers. We
have indeed:
Proposition 5 (Same degree of risk aversion) When both workers and em-
ployers have the same degree of risk aversion, ρ = a > 0, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium given by:
α∗ =
L
L+ n
β∗ =
n
L+ n
µ
q − ρLσ
2
L+ n
¶
− t L
n
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Before ethnic costs, workers obtain:
W ∗ = q − σ
2ρL (L/2 + n)
L+ n
− t L
n
and employers’ profits are equal to:
V =
µ
L
n
¶2 "
t+
ρ
2
µ
n
L+ n
¶2
σ2
#
In this case, employers find it optimal to set an impure piece rate contract
where workers receive a fixed part β∗ and a variable part α∗. This is because
employers and workers are both risk averse and thus must share the risk of
uncertain production. It is thus obvious that α∗ or β∗ can never be equal to
zero because both parties want to avoid the randomness of production.
It is interesting to observe that, in this case, α∗ only depends on the degree of
ethnic diversity in the economy, i.e. L and n. When n the number of employers
increases, then α∗ is reduced whereas β∗ is augmented if n is suﬃciently large.11
Indeed,more employers or less ethnic diversity implies fiercer competition since
workers and employers become more and more ethnically similar, and thus
employers tend to increase the fixed part and decrease the variable part of
wages. On the contrary, when workers are more diﬀerentiated (L increases)
and thus workers are more ethnically isolated from other ethnic groups, α∗
increases whereas β∗ decreases if n is suﬃciently large.12
Observe also that reducing t increases the fixed part of the wage β∗. As
above, this is because competition between employers become fiercer since each
employer has less market power over their (local) workers.
An interesting question is what happens to the model when ρ = a = 0. It is
then a model without uncertainty; the utility function of a worker working for
employer i is now given by Wi = αiq + βi and the profit function of employer
i is equal to Vi = [(1 − αi)q − βi](x − x) = (q −Wi)(x − x), where x and x
are still given by (6) and (7). By solving the symmetric Nash equilibrium, it
is easy to verify that we obtain the following relation:
(1− α)q − β = tL/n (14)
which implies that
W ∗ = q − tL/n and V ∗ = tL2/n2 (15)
We have the following result.
11It is indeed easy to check that L < n is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that ∂β∗/∂n > 0.
12Again, it is easy to verify that L < n is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that ∂β∗/∂L < 0.
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Proposition 6 (Risk neutrality) When both workers and employers are risk
neutral (a = ρ = 0), then any pay system can emerge. However, workers’ util-
ities and employers’ profits are always given by (15) and they depend on the
degree of isolation of workers from other communities.
Indeed, there are as many values of α and β that can satisfy equation (14),
given that α and β are negatively correlated. Therefore, any wage system
could be implemented and each of them will always lead to (15). For example,
if α = 0, then β = q − tL/n and a pure fixed-wage emerges. If β = 0, then
α = 1 − sL/(nq) < 1, employers set a pure piece-rate pay. If α = 1/2, then
β = q/2− tL/n, then an impure piece-rate contract prevails. Finally, if α = 1,
β = −tL/n, we have a full-residual claimant contract in which workers receive
all the benefits of their production but pay back some money to the employer.
5 Coexistence of fixed-wage and piece-rate con-
tracts in a regional context
Our framework can easily be extended to account for the coexistence of fixed-
wage and piece-rate contracts within and between regions, a widely observed
feature of labor markets in developing countries (see for example Bardhan
and Rudra, 1981, Dre`ze and Mukherjee, 1989, Baland et al., 1999). Indeed,
so far, we have assumed that all employers located in a region (i.e. equally
spaced along the circumference of the circle) have exactly the same level of
risk aversion ρ.
Assume now that there are two types of employers with risk averion, ρ1
and ρ2, and that all workers are still characterized by a. Assume also that
ρ1 < a < ρ2 and that, along the circumference of the circle, the location of firms
alternate from a firm of type ρ1 to a firm of type ρ2 (such that there exactly n1
firms of type ρ1 and n2 firms of type ρ2, with n1+n2 = n). It then easy to see
that, in equilibrium, if t is suﬃciently large (closed-knit societies), both fixed-
wage and piece-rate contracts will coexist. Employers of type ρ1 set fixed-wage
contracts whereas employers of type ρ2 set piece-rate contracts. Interestingly,
some workers who have quite similar ethnic background (for example, the ones
on the right of x and the ones on the left of x) will obtain diﬀerent contracts.
However, the general result here is that workers who are ethnically similar (i.e.
belonging to the ‘natural catchment area’ of each firm; for example workers
working for firm i and residing within an ethnical ‘distance’ [x, x] from landlord
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i) obtain the same type of contract.
Another interesting result, already stressed above, is the importance of the
degree of ethnicity of the region. If the region is very diverse (i.e. large L),
then diﬀerences between fixed wages and piece rates will increase. Finally, this
model also show that diﬀerent areas oﬀer diﬀerent wage contracts. Indeed, if
some regions are characterized by employers with a high degree of risk aversion
(for example, regions with small firms) and others by employers with a low
degree of risk aversion (for example, regions with large firms), then this model
enables us to explain the existence of diﬀerent wage contracts across regions.
Our results can be compared to that of Baland et al. (1999). Using a very
elegant model, in which individual eﬀort is explicitly taken into account, they
show that very-able laborers as well as low-ability laborers work on piece rates
because they can chose their own eﬀort level (the optimal number of tasks
performed under a piece-rate contract increases with the worker’s ability).
Laborers of middle ability will then be paid using fixed-wage contracts. They
also show that a monopsonistic employer always finds profitable to hire laborers
under both types of contracts.
6 Empirical relevance of the results
Let us summarize our results and see if they are empirically relevant. The first
set of results (Proposition 1) indicates that, in equilibrium, all employers oﬀer
the same wage contract, workers are hired by employers of the closest ethnic
aﬃliation and employers’ co-ethnics earn more than other workers.
Sadoulet et al. (1994) have studied two-rice growing farmer villages in
rural Thailand. In village N , located approximately 100 kilometers northwest
of Bangkok, characterized by high risk and widespread poverty, they show
that, of the share of tenancy contracts, 41% are among relatives. In village
Bo, located 20 kilometers east of Chian Mai City, characterized by low risk
because of non-farm activities, they show that, of the share tenancy contracts,
83% are between relatives, and these contracts are generally repeated over a
long period of time. Sadoulet et al. (1994) also observe that there are gift
exchanges in this village since landlords make after-harvest gifts of grains to
their tenants in exchange for hard work.
In another paper, Sadoulet et al. (1997) analyze a household survey that
they conduct in three villages of the Philippines in 1992. They show that most
sharecroppers have a kinship relationship with their landlords and that kin-
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ship ties with the landlord are a key determinant of cooperative behavior by
sharecroppers and hence a key determinant of eﬃciency. They show that the
terms of the contract aﬀect negatively the input decisions of non-kin share-
croppers but not those of kin sharecroppers and the latter use inputs at levels
similar to those of owner-operators and fixed-rent contracts. Inspection of Ta-
ble 4 in Sadoulet et al. (1997) indicates that non-kin sharecropper households
are somewhat less well oﬀ than the other categories. On average, they have
less land assets, they own less machinery, a smaller percentage of them have
oﬀ-farm income, and their oﬀ farm income is substantially lower.
Barr and Oduro (2002) focus on a labor market in the Ghanaian manufac-
turing sector. They use data from the fifth wave of the Ghanaian Manufac-
turing Enterprise Survey, where the sample of enterprises is drawn from four
cities in southern Ghana. Ghana’s index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(which formula is given by (1)) is 0.71, placing it close to the average for sub-
Saharan Africa of 0.65, thus indicating that the population is quite segmented
into several groups that are distinct in terms of language and/or culture. In a
labor market where both employers and employees come from diﬀerent ethnic
groups (see tables 2 and 3 in Barr and Oduro, 2002), they show that the eth-
nic distributions of employers and employees are very similar. They run the
following equation
lnwi = φ0 + φ1ri + φ2ci + φ3ei + φ4pi + φ2fi + ζi
where lnwi is the log of earnings for worker i, φ0 is a constant term, ri is a
dummy variable that takes value of 1 is the worker is related to the employer,
ci is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 is the worker is from the same
ethnic group as the employer, ei is a vector of dummies, one corresponding
to each ethnic group represented in the sample, pi is the vector of personal
characteristics of worker i, fi are employers’ fixed eﬀects (fixed across workers
not time) and ζi is the error term. The joint significance of φ1 tells us whether
there is variation across the ethnic groups, the signs and significance of spe-
cific elements of φ1 tell us whether particular groups earn significantly more
or less than the group chosen as a basis for comparison, and the signs and
significance of diﬀerences between the elements of φ1 provide us with similar
information about other pairwise comparisons. Significant and positive coeﬃ-
cients on ri and ci indicate that relatives and co-ethnics, respectively, receive
positive earning premium relative to other workers.
They find that eleven percent of workers are employed by a relative and a
further 23% are employed by a non-related member of the same ethnic group.
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More generally, worker from every ethnic group are more likely to work for a
member of their own ethnic group than for a member of another Ghanaian
ethnic group. Furthermore, they show that being related to the employer is
associated with a 23% earnings premium.
The second set of our results is also related to ethnicity. We have shown
in Proposition 2 that, given that sharecropping exists, the more ethnically
homogenous the labor market, the lower α∗ (the part of the remuneration that
depends of random production) and the higher β∗ (the independent part of
the remuneration) Also, the higher the ethnic cost t (more costly to interact
between diﬀerent ethnic groups), the lower β∗.
These results are consistent with the empirical results of Sadoulet et al.
(1997). Indeed, in Philippines, they show that sharetenants who have family
ties with their employer are not influenced by the terms of the contract (that
is α and β), while the other sharecroppers (who are further away from their
employer) respond negatively to a lower output share (i.e. lower α).
Wilson (1998) oﬀers even stronger evidence of our results by providing an
empirical analysis of labor transaction in the Lake Victoria13 fishing industry.
In this labor market, remuneration of both crew and owners (i.e. entrepreneurs
who has rights to the boat) usually take the form of distributing shares of the
catch. In our model, this would correspond to sharecropping with α∗ > 0 and
β∗ < 0. Share systems on the western part of the lake are mainly based on
dividing each day’s catch among the nongear-owning crew and the owners of
boats and gears. A typical example would be the boat and gear owner getting
60% of the proceeds from the catch after it is sold, and the crew getting 40%
after deducing for the crew’s food, the nets, for the boat maintenance and fuel.
In our model, this last part is β∗ < 0, while the first two parts are 1− α∗ and
α∗ (or at least a function of them), respectively.
Three observations are in order. First, the fishing business is very volatile
and thus risky since the output (i.e. the catch) strongly depends on weather
conditions. Risk bearing can thus explains the persistence of systems of catch
sharing in fisheries rather than wages and salaries. Second, social identities
(mainly kin groups, ethnic groups, and local religious congregations) play a
prominent role in the Lake Victoria fishing industry. Finally, even though this
study is about fishing industry and not about agriculture, it is very related to
our model since most workers live in rural areas and thus the findings apply
13Lake Victoria, shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, is the second largest freshwater
lake.
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to rural labor markets.
The analysis is of data gathered between March 1993 and November 1994
on nine randomly selected fish-landing sites, called throughout beaches, on
the Tanzanian shore of Lake Victoria. The sample unit is the fishing boat.
There results are from 102 fishing units that were currently or recently fishing.
Wilson (1998) takes as the dependent variable the percentage of the catch that
a nongear-owning fisher received as payment for his labor; this corresponds to
our α∗. Controlling for diﬀerent personal characteristics, Wilson (1998) obtains
the two following results (see his Table II). When a homogenous crew shares
an ethnic identity with the boat owner, this has a significant negative eﬀect
on α∗. When a homogenous crew confronts a boat owner from a diﬀerent
ethnic group, this has a significant positive eﬀect on α∗. These two results
are exactly testing Proposition 2 since they say that the more (less) ethnically
homogenous is the labor market, the lower (higher) is α∗ the random part of
the remuneration. Even if there is no evidence on β∗, it seems quite natural
to assume that crew members sharing a common ethnic identity with the boat
owner will pay lower fees (such as nets, boat maintenance and fuel) than other
crew members.
Finally, the last set of our results (Propositions 4, 5 and 6) can be
summarized in Table 1, which indicates which type of labor contract emerges
depending on the values of a and ρ.
Table 1
a
> 0 = 0
ρ > 0 Sharecropping Full-residual claimant contract
= 0 Fixed-rent contract Any contract
a: Degree of absolute risk aversion of workers
ρ: Degree of absolute risk aversion of firms
Much of empirical literature on contract choice, especially in developing
countries, has tried to measure workers’ and employers’ risk aversion. The
usual proxies are wealth and properties. The common problem in this liter-
ature is the necessity of controlling adequately for unobserved heterogeneity
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002, Chiappori and Salanie´, 2003). If it is not done
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properly, then the combination of unobserved heterogeneity and of endogenous
matching of agents to contracts is bound to create selection biases.
To illustrate this point, let us focus on the recent contribution of Ackerberg
and Botticini (2002). They consider the choice between sharecropping and
fixed rent contracts in a tenant-landlord relationship. They regress the type of
contract (fixed-rent contract or sharecropping) on crop riskiness and tenant’s
wealth. If wealth is taken to be a proxy for risk aversion, we would expect that
richer (and presumably less risk-averse) tenants are more likely to be under a
rental contract. However, wealth is only an imperfect proxy for risk-aversion,
and thus the unobserved component of risk-aversion is likely to be correlated
with crop riskiness. There is thus an endogeneity problem since we only observe
the match between agents (endogeneous matching). There are many stories
that suggest matching between heterogenous employers and workers. One
of them is employers with the some ethnic origin might end up matching
with workers of the same ethnic origin. To remedy this endogenous matching
problem, Ackerberg and Botticini instrument the crop riskiness variable, using
geographical variables as instruments.
Using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in
early Renaissance Tuscany, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) address the issue
of heterogeneity across agents and find some role for risk in the choice between
share contract and fixed rent contract. After for correcting for endogenous
matching between landlords and tenants, they find that wealthier tenants (thus
those who have lower risk aversion) are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts.
This finding suggests that risk sharing is an important determinant of contract
choice and is consistent with the predictions of our model, as described in Table
1.
Another paper that founds results consistent with our predictions is that of
Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995). Using Tunisian data, they show that tenants with
less working capital (thus more risk averse) tend to work under sharecropping.
Using a unique multi-country (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe)
panel data set for manufacturing firms in Africa, Bigsten et al. (2003) pro-
vide a test for the risk sharing model. Indeed, industrial firms in Africa are
exposed to very high risks, reflecting demand shocks, price volatility, unreli-
able infrastructure and poor contract enforcement (Fafchamps, 1996, Collier
and Gunning, 1999). At the same time in most African economies financial
markets, in particular for insurance, are poorly developed. This conjunction
of high risk and weak financial markets suggests that if risk sharing through
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(implicit) labor contracts is to be found anywhere it is in African manufac-
turing. Bigsten et al. (2003) find strong evidence for risk sharing and labor
imperfections (when a firm experienced a negative shock, it is costly for work-
ers to move to another firm). It is only where such costs exist that risk sharing
contracts can be enforced. Risk sharing is only observed for non-production
workers (production workers cover people with few skills thus more mobile
group).
7 Concluding remarks
Though the model used in this paper may seem quite stylized, we believe that
it captures some basic features of optimal compensations in rural/urban labor
markets in less developed countries in the context of ethnically diﬀerentiated
workers and employers. It shows the role of market structure, ethnic diversity
and market competition as well as of the degree of risk aversion of workers
and employers in the determination of firms’ choice of methods of pay. In an
uncertain production environment, our model shows that, in equilibrium, firms
tend to hire workers of similar ethnic background and employers’ co-ethnics
earn more than other workers. It also shows that large language and cultural
diﬀerences lead to lower wages because only workers and employers of similar
ethnic origin can work together.
More generally, we believe that the ethnic origin of both employers and em-
ployees is of paramount importance to understand the working of labor markets
in less developed countries and should therefore be investigated further.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Our model uses the circle model of Salop (1979). So the spirit of our model
is quite the same but the proof of existence and uniqueness is quite diﬀerent
since landlords strategically choose two variables α and β whereas in Salop
they choose only one variable, the prices.
As it is well-known in the circle model of Salop (1979), the labor supply
function14 for each landlord is not diﬀerentiable and not continuous. There
are in fact three regions: the monopsony region where each landlord attracts
only laborers between x and x and some laborers do not work; the competitive
region (our case) where all laborers take a job and landlords compete to attract
them and finally the supercompetitive region where one landlord, by setting a
wage suﬃciently high, can attract all laborers of its neighbor landlord. This
labor supply is not diﬀerentiable everywhere because there is a first kink when
one switches from the monopsony region to the competitive region and another
one when one switches from the competitive region to the supercompetitive
region (see Figure 1, page 143, in Salop, 1979). This labor supply is also not
continuous because when one switches from the competitive region to the su-
percompetitive region, a landlord i that attracts the worker located at yi+1,
i.e. the location of the landlord i + 1, attracts at the same time all labor-
ers located between yi+1 and the marginal worker who is indiﬀerent between
landlords i + 1 and i + 2 (see Figure 1, page 143, in Salop, 1979). Therefore,
in order to show the existence and uniqueness of our symmetric equilibrium,
we proceed as follows. We first restrict ourselves to the competitive region
(as we did in the text) where the labor supply is continuous and diﬀerentiable
everywhere (within the competitive region) and show that the profit function
V (·) is strictly concave so that, within this region, there exists a unique maxi-
mum. We then have to check that, at this equilibrium, all laborers take a job.
Furthermore, we also have to check that all possible deviations of landlord i
from our symmetric equilibrium is not profitable. There are in fact only two
possible deviations: one in the supercompetitive region, one in the monopsony
region. We already know from Salop (1979) that a deviation to the supercom-
petitive region is never profitable because landlord i has to set a wage higher
14Since Salop deals with the product market and us with the labor market, what we called
here the labor supply corresponds to the product demand in Salop’s model. Similarly, wages
correspond to prices, monopsony to monopoly, etc...
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or equal than the marginal productivity of its laborers and thus make negative
or null profits. However, we have to check that the second deviation, i.e. to
the monopsony region, is not profitable for landlord i.
Let us start with the following result.
Lemma 1 In the competitive region, the profit function V (·) is strictly concave
in αi and βi.
Proof. Remember first that
Wi = αi q + βi −
a
2
α2iσ
2
so that
∂Wi
∂αi
= q − aαiσ2 and
∂Wi
∂βi
= 1
In this context, the first order conditions yield:15
∂V
∂α
≡ Vα =
µ
q − αqσ2
t
¶£
(1− α)q − β − ρ(1− α)2σ2(x− x)
¤
(16)
−
£
q − ρ (1− α)σ2(x− x)
¤
(x− x) = 0
∂V
∂β
≡ Vβ = −(x− x) +
1
t
£
(1− α)q − β − ρ(1− α)2σ2(x− x)
¤
= 0
(17)
We have now to show that the Hessian matrix is negative definite, i.e.
Vαα < 0 and VααVββ − VαβVαβ > 0. We have:
∂2V
∂α2
≡ Vαα = −
aσ2
t
£
(1− α)q − β − ρ(1− α)2σ2(x− x)
¤
− ρσ2(x− x)2
−2
µ
q − aασ2
t
¶£
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2(x− x)
¤
−
µ
q − aασ2
t
¶2 £
ρ(1− α)2σ2
¤
We want to show that Vαα < 0. For observe that at the symmetric equilib-
rium y − x = L/n. Therefore, for Vαα < 0, we will show that (i) : (1− α)q −
β−ρ(1−α)2σ2L/n > 0, (ii) : q−aασ2 > 0 and (iii) : q−2ρ(1−α)σ2L/n > 0.
(i) First, using (17), we have
(1− α)q − β − ρ(1− α)2σ2L
n
=
tL
n
> 0 (18)
15We skip the index i since we are at a symmetric equilibrium.
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(ii) Second, using (17), we also have:
q − ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
=
µ
1
1− α
¶µ
β +
tL
n
¶
Using (10), it is easy to check that in (12), q > σ2ρLa/(ρL+ an) so that
β + tL/n > 0 and thus
q − ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
=
µ
1
1− α
¶µ
β +
tL
n
¶
> 0 (19)
Then, by plugging (18) into (16), it is easy to verify by using (19) that:
q − aασ2 = q − ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
> 0 (20)
(iii) Finally, condition (10) guarantees that q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L/n > 0.
Now, using (i), (ii) and (iii), it is to see that Vαα < 0.
Let us continue our demonstration of the concavity of V (·). We have:
∂2V
∂β2
≡ Vββ = −
1
t
∙
2 +
ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¸
< 0
∂2V
∂α∂β
≡ Vαβ = Vβα ≡
∂2V
∂β∂α
= −1
t
∙
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2(x− x) + (q − aασ2)
µ
1 +
ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¶¸
After some manipulations and using the fact that, at the symmetric equi-
librium, x− x = L/n and (18), we obtain:
VααVββ − VαβVαβ
=
∙
2 +
ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¸µ
a+ ρ
L
n
¶
σ2t
L
n
+
∙
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸ ∙
3q − 4aασ2 + 2ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸
+(q − aασ2)
µ
2ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¶ ∙
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸
− (q − aασ2)2
By (10), q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L/n > 0. Moreover, using (20), we have:
ρ(1− α)L
n
= aα
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so that
3q − 4aασ2 + 2ρ(1− α)σ2L/n
= 3q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L/n
= q + 2
£
q − ρ(1− α)σ2L/n
¤
= q + 2(q − aασ2) > 0
We have therefore:
VααVββ − VαβVαβ
=
∙
2 +
ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¸µ
a+ ρ
L
n
¶
σ2t
L
n
+ q
∙
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸
+(q − aασ2)
µ
2ρ(1− α)2σ2
t
¶ ∙
q − 2ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸
+(q − aασ2)
∙
q − 3ρ(1− α)σ2L
n
¸
Since by using (10), q− 2ρ(1− α)σ2L/n > 0 and q− 3ρ(1− α)σ2L/n > 0,
we have VααVββ − VαβVαβ > 0.
Because of Lemma 1 and because in the competitive region, the profit
function V (·) is continuous in (αi−1, αi, αi+1) and in (βi−1, βi, βi+1), we can
guarantee that there exists a locally unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in
wages. Then, by combining (16) and (17), and by equalizing the equilibrium
α and β, we obtain (at the symmetric Nash equilibrium) a unique (11) and
(12). Then, we deduce the equilibrium compensation W ∗ given by (12). Fur-
thermore, using (9), it is easy to obtain (13).
We must now check that at the equilibrium candidate (12) all laborers
take a job and that this wage is always positive. The equilibrium wage (12) is
greater than 0 if:
W ∗ > 0 ⇔ q > σ
2ρLa (ρL/2 + an)
(ρL+ an)2
+
tL
n
(21)
and the condition ensuring that there is full employment at the equilibrium
candidate (12) (the worker with the worst match must have a positive utility)
is given by:
W ∗ − tL
2n
> 0 ⇔ q > σ
2ρLa (ρL/2 + an)
(ρL+ an)2
+
3tL
n
(22)
Clearly, (22) implies (21) so that (22) guarantees that in equilibrium all labor-
ers take a job and that the utility after ethnic costs is positive for all laborers.
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Now, we have to show that it is not optimal for landlord i to deviate from
our symmetric equilibrium by setting the monopsony wage. It is easy to verify
that the monopsony wage is equal to q/2. So we have to set a condition that
rules out this possible deviation. It suﬃces to show that, at the monopsony
wage q/2, the worker located at xi (i.e. at the location of landlord i) who thus
have no ethnic cost prefer to work in landlord i + 1 than to landlord i. This
condition is given by:
W ∗ − tL
n
>
q
2
where W ∗ is the symmetric Nash equilibrium wage given by (12). It is easy to
verify that condition (10) guarantees that bothW ∗−tL/n > q/2 and (22). We
have thus shown that, using (10), the local maximum is a global one and that
our symmetric Nash equilibrium given by (11) and (12) exists and is unique.
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